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Few would dispute that the constitutional relationship between the federal 
government and the states occupied a central place on the Supreme Court’s docket during 
the tenure of William Rehnquist as Chief Justice.  In a series of highly publicized 
decisions, the Rehnquist Court reinvigorated several federalism-based constraints on the 
national government, narrowing the breadth of Congress’s legislative powers and 
expanding the states’ immunity from federal regulation and from suits for damages.  One 
might argue that, in terms of practical consequences, these decisions were more 
symbolic1 than revolutionary.2 But the Court clearly revived the salience of federalism as 
a principle of constitutional law.   
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1 Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1321 (1999) 
(“Scrutiny of the recent decisions reveals them to be largely symbolic bows to a 
federalism myth rather than real limitations on federal power.”).  See also Ann Althouse, 
Inside the Federalism Cases: Concern About the Federal Courts, 574 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132, 142 (2001); Jim Chen, Filburn’s Forgotten Footnote—Of 
Farm Team Federalism and Its Fate, 82 MINN. L. REV. 249, 254 (1997); Jesse H. Choper 
& John C. Yoo, Who’s So Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment: The Limited Impact of the 
2By most accounts, Justice O’Connor played a central role in this “federalism 
revival.”  Drawing on her experience as a state judge and legislator in Arizona, the story 
goes, O’Connor’s decisionmaking emphasized the importance of independent state 
sovereignty within our constitutional system.  She was a consistent member of the five-
justice majority that invalidated federal legislation as beyond Congress’s commerce 
power; 3 that circumscribed Congress’s authority to enact legislation under section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment; 4 that struck down federal legislation that directed the states 
to regulate in specific ways; 5 and that narrowed Congress’s capacity to the states to suits 
 
Court’s Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (2006); Douglas Laycock, 
Protecting Liberty in a Federal System: The US Experience, in PATTERNS OF 
REGIONALISM AND FEDERALISM: LESSONS FOR THE UK 119, 140 (Jorg Fedtke & B. S. 
Markesinis eds., 2005); Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal Government? 
State Sovereign Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 TEX. L. 
REV. 1551 (2003) (book review).  As Roderick Hills has succinctly summarized it, 
“Revolution, Schmevolution.”  Roderick M. Hills, The End of States’ Rights?, Legal 
Affairs Debate Club, July 18, 2005 (available at 
http://legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_fedrev0705.msp#Friday) (last visited 
July 27, 2005).  Hills goes on to write that the Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions 
imposed an “extremely modest brake on the centripetal tendencies of American 
constitutional law,” and that “[f]rom the outset, the Court made it perfectly clear to 
anyone who bothered to listen that its ambitions for trimming back on national powers 
were modest and largely apolitical.”  Id. 
2 A May 2006 search in the Westlaw Journals and Law Reviews database (JLR) found 52 
documents using the terms “Rehnquist Court” and “federalism revolution” in the same 
paragraph.  See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS L.J. 569, 618 (2003); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Our 
Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1690 (2004).  The New York Times 
has used the term “federalism revolution” 30 times since June 2000.  See, e.g., Linda 
Greenhouse, Roberts Court Hears Its First Case in Federalism Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
10, 2005, at A21; Jeffrey Rosen, A Majority of One, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 3, 2001, at 
32. 
3 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995).   
4 Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
5 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992). 
3for damages when they violate federal law.6 And some of O’Connor’s more notable 
opinions—for instance, her majority opinions in Gregory v. Ashcroft7 and New York v. 
United States8 and her dissents in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority9
and South Dakota v. Dole10—exalted the importance of preserving the prerogatives of 
state governments as a counterweight to federal power.   
Much of this storyline rings true.  But as any student of American government 
will tell you, there is more to federalism than the limits on Congress’s enumerated 
powers.  The Constitution also places structural limits on state power that are designed to 
protect the interests of the nation as a whole.  And in cases implicating these “union-
preserving” provisions11—the dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV, the Import-Export Clause, the doctrine of intergovernmental 
immunity, and, most significantly, the doctrine of preemption—O’Connor’s voting 
record lacked a similar dedication to protecting the states’ independent policymaking 
authority.  In these cases, she essentially voted no differently than the average justice 
with whom she served.  
O’Connor’s approach to federalism was therefore more complicated than most 
observers seem to have appreciated.  To be sure, she consistently voted in favor of 
enforcing the federalism-based limits on Congress’s legislative powers.  But she was 
 
6 Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 
U.S. 62 (2000) (ADEA); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); College Savings Bank v. 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
7 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
8 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
9 469 U. S. 528, 580–589 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
10 483 U.S. 203, 212–218 (1987). 
11 I borrow the term “union-preserving” from LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §6–1, at 1021 (3d ed. 2000). 
4relatively ambivalent about preserving the states’ independent regulatory authority more 
generally.  That is, she did not seem to care any more than the average justice about the 
states’ autonomy to regulate as they see fit in areas of overlapping federal and state 
legislative jurisdiction.   
This article presents a statistical summary of Justice O’Connor’s votes in the full 
universe of cases addressing the Constitution’s federalism-based constraints on 
governmental power.  Specifically, it compares her voting record to those of the other 
justices who sat in the same cases.  The results suggest that O’Connor’s reputation as an 
ardent proponent of state autonomy needs to be tempered, for it is only accurate with 
respect to disputes about the powers of the national government.  If we expand our 
definition of federalism to include those disputes that involved the Constitution’s 
structural limits on state power, her dedication to state autonomy seems relatively tepid.  
In fact, an equally prominent theme—especially during her last eleven full terms on the 
Court—is that she tended to disfavor government regulation of any sort, whether it 
emanated from Congress or the states.   
This is not to say that Justice O’Connor’s voting behavior was normatively or 
jurisprudentially inconsistent; there may have been principled justifications for tending to 
favor state policymaking autonomy in one context but not the other.  Nor is it to suggest 
that she consciously used the façade of federalism to accommodate a political preference 
for less regulation; the nature of human decisionmaking is such that the “true” reasons for 
a decision are often unknowable, especially to the decisionmaker herself.12 Rather, the 
 
12 See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 3 (1999) (describing 
how people tend to arrive at decisions that they are motivated to reach while being 
unaware of that motivation’s influence); Mahzarin R. Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice,
5point is strictly descriptive: in the full universe of decisions involving the constitutional 
boundaries between federal and state power, O’Connor was comparatively protective of 
state autonomy only in cases addressing the limits on congressional authority.  
This article proceeds in four parts.  Part I briefly describes the Rehnquist Court’s 
federalism revival and Justice O’Connor’s role in that project.   Part II explains that, 
given the breadth of Congress’s modern regulatory authority, the latitude afforded state 
governments in areas of concurrent federal and state jurisdiction may actually be more 
important to the values of federalism than enforcing of the outer limits of congressional 
power.  Thus, to gain a complete understanding of a justice’s attitude towards 
constitutional federalism, we need to review those cases implicating the structural 
provisions that constrain the states, not just those involving the limits on the national 
government.  Part III summarizes Justice O’Connor’s voting record in the entire universe 
of federalism cases, so defined, comparing her votes to those of the justices with whom 
she served.  Finally, Part IV offers some observations about the study’s results.  Most 
interestingly, they show that O’Connor voted to limit regulation as frequently as she 
voted to enhance state autonomy.  In other words, across the full run of federalism cases, 
O’Connor was as much a proponent of reducing government regulation as she was of 
enhancing state autonomy. 
 
PSYCHOL. SCI. AGENDA, Jan.–Feb. 2001, at 8, 8 (“Consciousness . . . permits a view of 
who we are and what we are capable of that is independent of the knowledge and feelings 
that may drive beliefs, attitudes, and behavior.”); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The 
Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 
1, 25–34 (2004) (reviewing literature on how human beings are largely unaware of the 
many influences on their decisionmaing). 
 
6I.  THE FEDERALISM “REVIVAL”
This much is not news: the Rehnquist Court reshaped the constitutional rules 
governing the respective roles of the national government and the states in our federal 
republic.13 It articulated a new and arguably narrower standard for evaluating whether a 
 
13 The thoughtful and perceptive commentary on the Rehnquist Court’s federalism 
jurisprudence is far too voluminous to cite in its entirety.  Here is just a sampling: LARRY 
D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (2004); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE 
SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002); MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED:
THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005); Matthew D. 
Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and 
Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71; Vikram David Amar, The New “New Federalism,” 6
GREEN BAG 2d 349 (2003); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the 
Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); Evan H. Caminker, 
“Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127
(2001); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80
(2001); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s 
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002); David L. Franklin, Facial 
Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IOWA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006) (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=887577); Philip P. Frickey & Steven 
S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An 
Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707 (2002); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The 
Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1225 (2001); 
Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 U.C.L.A. LAW 
REV. (forthcoming 2006); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: 
Printz and Principle, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998); Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of 
Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable Injury, and Section 1983, 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 1311 (2001); Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federlism: United States v. Lopez, 
1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125; John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The 
Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002); 
Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343;
Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis,
47 ST. LOUIS L.J. 569 (2003); J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The Rehnquist 
Court and the Political Dynamics of Federalism, 2 PERPECTIVES ON POLITICS 233 (2004); 
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and the Section Five 
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 
1943 (2003); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and 
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554 (1995); Jed 
7federal statute falls within Congress’s commerce power.14 It developed a fairly 
restrictive understanding of the breadth of Congress’s legislative authority under Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring that such legislation be “congruent and 
proportional” to the constitutional violations that Congress seeks to remedy or prevent.15 
It minted the so-called “anticommandeering” principle, which prohibits Congress from 
directing the states to enact or implement particular regulation.16 It held that Congress 
cannot use its Article I powers to enact legislation subjecting the states to suits for 
damages,17 overruling the relatively recent precedent of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas.18 
And it extended this principle of sovereign immunity to suits brought in any court, 
whether state or federal,19 as well as to adjudicative proceedings before federal 
administrative agencies.20 
Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002); Robert A. 
Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 78 (1995); Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining 
the Court’s Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477 (2001); Ernest A. Young, The 
Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
14 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil remedy 
provision of the Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act).   
15 See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (finding the civil remedy provision of the Violence 
Against Women Act invalid under section 5); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997) (invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).    
16 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144 (1992).  
17 See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
18 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
19 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 506 (1999) (holding that Congress lacked the authority 
to subject the states to private, unconsenting suits for damages in state court under the 
National Labor Relations Act). 
20 See Federal Maritime Comm'n v. South Carolina Ports Authority, 535 U. S. 743 
(2002).  Perhaps as notably, in fashioning these doctrinal innovations, the Court has 
asserted itself as the ultimate arbiter of questions concerning the breadth of Congress’s 
power vis-à-vis the states, invalidating national legislation on federalism grounds at a rate 
8Aside from these constitutional rulings, the Rehnquist Court also invoked 
federalism principles in several cases of statutory interpretation to limit the encroachment 
of federal regulation on the states themselves or into areas historically regulated by the 
states alone.  For instance, in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,21 the Court stated 
that when “Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States 
and the Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in 
the language of the statute.’”22 It therefore held that neither a state nor its officials, when 
acting in their official capacities, were “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983.23 
Similarly, the Court held in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States24 that 
a private individual could not bring a qui tam action against a state under the False 
Claims Act because the states are not “persons” subject to suit under the Act.  Alluding to 
“the doctrine that statutes should be construed so as to avoid difficult constitutional 
questions,” the Court noted that “there is ‘a serious doubt’” as to “whether an action in 
federal court by a qui tam relator against a State would run afoul of the Eleventh 
Amendment.”25 
unseen in several generations. See, e.g., David Franklin, Marijuana and Judicial 
Modesty, CHICAGO TRIB., June 9, 2005, at 27; Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Deference, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Nov. 6, 2000, at 38. 
21 491 U.S. 58 (1989). 
22 Id. at 65 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)). 
23 Id. at 71. 
24 529 U.S. 765 (2000). 
25 Id. at 787.  See also Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) (invoking the 
same canon of constitutional doubt to hold that the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§844(i), does not apply to owner-occupied residences that have not been used for any 
commercial purpose). 
9Some have argued—and with some force—that the practical effects of the 
Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions have actually been quite modest.26 For instance, 
the Court’s Commerce Clause decisions affect only a small spectrum of activity that 
Congress might otherwise regulate—activity that is non-commercial, non-economic, and 
purely intrastate.  Its sovereign immunity decisions leave open a host of alternative means 
for enforcing federal law against state governments, most notably suits for injunctions 
under Ex Parte Young.27 And its anticommandeering decisions prohibit a form of 
legislation that Congress had employed only rarely, and for which there are typically a 
number of effective substitutes.  Perhaps most significantly, the Rehnquist Court did 
nothing to trim Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause, leaving Congress the 
ability to circumvent most of these constraints by enacting conditional spending 
legislation aimed at the states.28 
Still, even if the Rehnquist Court’s decisions did not constitute a “federalism 
revolution,” they seem to have done something. It is now clear (as it was not before 
1995) that there are judicially enforceable limits on Congress’s commerce power, 
particularly with respect to activities that have historically been regulated by the states.  
Congress’s capacity to enact legislation to enforce the proscriptions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment has been narrowed, such that any legislative effort to enforce a constitutional 
right or to protect a class of citizens that the Court has not deemed deserving of 
heightened judicial scrutiny is virtually per se invalid.  And because Congress can 
abrogate the sovereign immunity of states only through legislation enacted under the 
 
26 See note 1 supra.
27 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
28 See Mark Tushnet, Alarmism vs. Moderation in Responding to the Rehnquist Court, 78
IND. L.J. 47, 52 (2003). 
10 
Reconstruction Amendments, Congress has lost an important means for enforcing federal 
law against the states.  These consequences are not trivial.   
Moreover, if the Rehnquist Court did not move the law in revolutionary directions 
itself, it may nonetheless have laid the groundwork for a future Court to do so.  As others 
have noted, the newly constituted Roberts Court could use the Rehnquist Court’s 
precedents to disrupt some long-settled constitutional understandings.29 It could hold that 
landmark environmental legislation, such as the Endangered Species Act or the Clean 
Water Act, is beyond Congress’s commerce power, at least in many of its applications, 
because the regulated activity is not sufficiently connected to interstate commerce.30 It 
could conclude that the anticommandeering decisions have effectively undermined 
Garcia and hold that Congress cannot use its commerce power to regulate certain 
functions of state governments.  It could hold that the disparate impact provisions of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are unconstitutional as applied to state governments, 
at least with respect to private suits for damages, because they are not “congruent and 
proportional” to any purported constitutional violations.31 Or conceivably, though much 
 
29 See TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 320–29. 
30 See, e.g., GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2004) (six 
circuit judges dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc, suggesting that application of 
the Endangered Species Act to a species of cave bugs in Texas is unconstitutional); 
Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (two judges, including 
John Roberts, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc and concluding that application 
of the Endangered Species Act to arroyo toads in California might be beyond Congress’s 
commerce power); Bruce Ackerman, The Art of Stealth, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Feb. 17, 
2005, available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v27/n04/print/acke01_.html (last visited Aug. 10, 
2005) (“It would be child’s play for a neo-con majority to strike down the Endangered 
Species Act as beyond the Commerce Clause.”). 
31 See Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that 
Title VII's disparate impact standard exceeds Congress’s Section 5 authority); TUSHNET,
supra note 13, at 326–27; Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: 
Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 494–95 (2003). 
11 
less likely, it could hold that most federal anti-discrimination legislation is beyond 
Congress’s commerce power because the regulated activity of discrimination—whether 
based on race, gender, religion, age, or disability—is not “economic” or “commercial” in 
nature.32 
Whatever the ultimate significance of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism project, 
the conventional wisdom seems to be that Justice O’Connor played a central role in its 
development.  When O’Connor announced her retirement in July 2005, assessments of 
her legacy teemed with references to her views on the balance between federal and state 
power.  In its tribute, the New York Times editorial page mentioned her “strong support 
for federalism,” and that “[s]he was fiercely protective of states’ rights.”33 Nina 
Totenberg observed that O’Connor “became part of a conservative states-rights 
majority,”34 while Linda Greenhouse wrote that she had been “a loyal ally” of Rehnquist 
“in the court’s continuing reappraisal of the relationship between the states and the 
federal government.”35 Academics echoed these views.  A.E. Dick Howard said that “it 
was O’Connor as much as Rehnquist . . . who revived the doctrine of states’ rights,”36 
while John Yoo commented that O’Connor’s “signature issue, . . . that historians will 
look back on, is that she really was the person who helped bring about and restore states’ 
rights and more of a balance of powers between the federal government and the state 
 
32 See TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 325–26.   
33 Justice O’Connor, N.Y.TIMES, July 2, 2005, at A14. 
34 Sandra Day O’Connor, National Public Radio, All Things Considered, July 1, 2005.  
35 Linda Greenhouse, Consistently, A Pivotal Role, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at A1. 
36 Michael D. Lemonick & Viveca Novak, The Power Broker, TIME, July 11, 2005, at 30. 
12 
governments.”37 Stephen Wermeil’s view nicely summarizes the prevailing sentiment: 
O’Connor was  
 
strongly motivated by her own abiding faith in good government at the state level 
and her belief that the Framers of the Constitution envisioned a genuine 
partnership of shared powers between the federal government and the states.  Her 
experience as a state legislator and judge [gave] her a degree of trust in state 
government and state courts that [went] well beyond that of her colleagues.38 
There is a great deal of truth in these perceptions.  Most prominently, O’Connor 
joined each of the Rehnquist Court’s landmark decisions that invalidated acts of Congress 
on federalism grounds.39 And unlike in other areas of the law, O’Connor rarely swung 
over to the Court’s more liberal wing to form a majority coalition.40 In fact, in the last 
 
37 John Yoo, PBS, Newshour with Jim Lehrer, July 1, 2005 (trascript available at 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec05/oconnor_7-1.html). 
38 Stephen J. Wermeil, O’Connor: A Dual Role: Introduction, 13 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP.
129, 139 (1991).  See also Marci Hamilton, The Remarkable Legacy of Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor, FINDLAW, July 14, 2005 (available at 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20050714.html) (writing of “Justice O’Connor's 
belief in the decentralization of power in the constitutional scheme” and “in the 
importance of preserving a sphere of regulation for the states that may well differ from, 
and even pose a challenge to, the federal government’s larger public policy”); Rosen, 
supra note 2, at 32 (referring to O’Connor’s “attachment to states’ rights” and “the 
federalism revolution that O’Connor has led”); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, 
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 903, 928 (1994) 
(calling O’Connor one of “federalism’s most enthusiastic proponents”); Ernest A. Young, 
Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival after Gonzales v. 
Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (calling O’Connor “the Court’s most consistently pro-
federalism member”). 
39 See notes 3–6 supra and accompanying text. 
40 See Whittington, supra note 13, at 507.  O’Connor’s only notable defections from the 
typical, five-justice pro-state majority in cases involving the federalism-based limits on 
Congress were in the two Eleventh Amendment decisions of Tennessee v. Lane and 
Nevada v. Hibbs. See Part III.B infra.
13 
high-profile federalism decision of her tenure on the Court, Gonzales v. Raich,41 
O’Connor authored a strident dissent from the Court’s holding that Congress could 
regulate the possession of home-grown marijuana used exclusively for medicinal 
purposes.  While Justices Scalia and Kennedy sided with the pro-Congress majority, 
O’Connor argued that such an application of the federal Controlled Substances Act 
ventured into a sphere reserved exclusively to the states: “If the Court always defers to 
Congress as it does today, little may be left to the notion of enumerated powers.”42 
Moreover, in addition to authoring some of the more significant opinions in the 
federalism revival,43 O’Connor used her opinions to advance fairly deep theoretical 
justifications for federalism as an abiding constitutional principle—deeper than she 
tended to develop in other contexts.  In her dissent in FERC v. Mississippi,44 for instance, 
O’Connor contended that “the 50 states serve as laboratories for the development of new 
social, economic, and political ideas,”45 citing the examples of women’s suffrage, 
unemployment insurance, minimum wage laws, no-fault auto insurance, and 
environmental protection.46 She also argued that “federalism enhances the opportunity of 
all citizens to participate in representative government”;47 citizens “cannot learn the 
lessons of self-government if their local efforts are devoted to reviewing proposals 
formulated by a faraway national legislature.”48 Finally, she posited that “our federal 
 
41 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
42 Id. at 2223 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
43 E.g., Kimel v. Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
44 456 U.S. 742 (1982). 
45 Id. at 788 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
46 Id. at 788–89. 
47 Id. at 789. 
48 Id. at 790. 
14 
system provides a salutary check on governmental power,” noting that “[u]nless we 
zealously protect” these divisions of authority, “we risk upsetting the balance of power 
that buttresses our basic liberties.”49 Or, as she wrote in Gregory v. Ashcroft, “[j]ust as 
the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government 
serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy 
balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of 
tyranny and abuse from either front.”50 
In short, there is much to be said for the conventional view of O’Connor as a 
strong defender of state autonomy.  But the decisions on which these perceptions seem to 
be based all addressed the Constitution’s structural limits on the national government.  
From New York to Lopez to Garrett to Raich, the issue was whether Congress had 
exceeded its enumerated powers, and thus impermissibly intruded on state sovereignty.  
But, as explained further below, federalism is a two-way street.  It is as much about the 
structural limits on the states as those on the national government.  Thus, a conception of 
federalism that focuses solely on the breadth of the Congress’s authority is unduly 
narrow, for it ignores the degree to which states can (or cannot) exercise policymaking 
autonomy in areas of concurrent federal and state regulatory jurisdiction—which is to 
say, most areas of modern American life.51 To gain a more complete picture, we need to 
widen the lens of federalism, the point to which I now turn. 
 
II.  A BROADER CONCEPTION OF FEDERALISM 
49 Id. 
50 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). 
51 See Fallon, supra note 13, at 431–33; Massey, supra note 13, at 502–12; Young, supra 
note 13, at 130–34. 
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In its plainest terms, federalism is a system of governance in which two distinct 
governments simultaneously exercise sovereignty over the same population and 
geographic territory.  It implies a constitutionalized division of power between these two 
centers of authority—between the national and state governments—with neither fully 
answerable to the other, each independent sovereigns in certain respects, yet all part of 
one nation.52 For this division of power to work in practice, there must be rules that 
delineate the respective roles of the national and state governments.  These rules need not 
be enforced by the courts, nor must they be formally codified.  But for a system of 
government to be accurately characterized as federal, such rules must exist in one form or 
another.53 
More to the point, these rules must limit both centers of power, not just the 
national government.  While an unconstrained national government could potentially 
swallow up the independent existence of the states—a point the Rehnquist Court 
repeatedly emphasized—so, too, might the states act in ways that would effectively 
 
52 See, e.g., Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 375 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.) (“The 
essence of a constitutionally formulated federalism is the division of political and legal 
powers between two systems of government constituting a single Nation.”).  
53 It is worth noting that federalism has no particular ideological valence.  See Cross, 
supra note 13, at 1307–1308 (“states’ rights arguments are not inherently ideological”).  
Although it has generally been associated with conservative political causes over the 
course of American history, that has not always been the case.  Indeed, recent issues—
such as the medicinal use of marijuana, physician-assisted suicide, and gay marriage, not 
to mention the presidential election dispute in Florida in 2000—have all involved 
circumstances in which progressive political causes have embraced the principle of state 
policymaking autonomy.  Nor does the concept of federalism, in itself, dictate a specific 
balance of power between the national government and the states.  Of course, for a 
system of federalism to be truly federalist, both centers of government must have some 
independent existence.  But beyond that minimum, authentically federal systems can 
differ quite dramatically in the relative strengths of the national government and the 
states.  
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destroy the Union.54 Indeed, problems of this sort under the Articles of Confederation, 
especially in commercial matters, were largely why the Constitution came into being.55 
A principal defect of the Articles was that they did little to prevent the states from acting 
in self-interested ways that undermined the interests of the nation as a whole.  States 
imposed various barriers to interstate commerce, such as protective tariffs on goods from 
other states; they often failed to comply with the Continental Congress’s requisitions, the 
chief mechanism for funding the federal government; they encroached on the federal 
government’s authority, such as by entering into compacts with each other and signing 
their own treaties with Indian tribes; and they disregarded international agreements that 
the federal government had reached with other nations.56 In the words of James Madison, 
the states had a “centrifugal tendency” to “fly out of their proper orbits and destroy the 
order & harmony of the political system.”57 A chief purpose of the Constitution, then, 
was to create a “firm union” that would preserve the “peace and liberty of the states”58—
54 This was, of course, the animating idea behind the Court’s holding in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), that Maryland’s tax on the Bank of the United 
States was unconstitutional.  As Chief Justice Marshall wrote, to permit states such a 
power would be “in its nature incompatible with, and repugnant to, the constitutional 
laws of the Union.”  Id. at 425. 
55 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 
132-61, 354-63, 393-429, 463-67 (1969).  See also KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD 
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 123 (15th ed. 2004) (“the poor condition of American 
commerce and the proliferating trade rivalries among the states were the immediate 
provocations for the calling of the Constitutional Convention”). 
56 See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 55, at 123; GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9–10 (5th ed. 2005) (discussing Madison’s memorandum to 
himself in April 1787 in preparation for the Constitutional Convention).  See also 1 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 164 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
(“Experience had evinced a constant tendency in the States to encroach on the federal 
authority; to violate national Treaties; to infringe the rights & interests of each other.”). 
57 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 165 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911). 
58 THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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to reduce“[t]he interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States” that had become 
“injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the 
Confederacy.”59 
Structural limits on state authority have thus been a central aspect of American 
federalism from the beginning.  And those limits, manifested in several distinct 
constitutional provisions and doctrines, remain critical elements of our governmental 
structure.60 The Supremacy Clause, through the doctrine of preemption, dictates that 
validly enacted federal laws shall negate any state laws with which they conflict.  The 
dormant Commerce Clause generally nullifies state laws that discriminate against, or 
place undue burdens on, interstate commerce.  The Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV forbids states from discriminating against the citizens of other states unless 
there is a substantial reason for doing so, and the discrimination is substantially related to 
that justification.  The doctrine of intergovernmental immunity prohibits states from 
directly regulating the federal government or enacting laws that discriminate against the 
federal government’s interests.61 And the Import-Export and Duty of Tonnage Clauses 
impose very specific constraints on the states’ taxing powers.   
Cases involving these union-preserving aspects of federalism tend to receive less 
attention than those addressing the breadth of Congress’s legislative authority.  They are 
often fact-specific, turning on the precise scope or purpose of the state or federal laws at 
issue.  They do not typically address broad constitutional principles.  Still, the overall 
 
59 THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 144–45 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
60 TRIBE, supra note 11, at §6–1, 1021. 
61 See Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 811 (1989).  This doctrine, as 
it affects government employees, is now codified in the Public Salary Tax Act, 4 U.S.C. 
§111.  The Supreme Court has held that the scope of the statutory prohibition and the 
constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity are coterminous.  
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trajectory of these decisions is quite important to the federal-state balance—perhaps even 
more important to the underlying values of federalism than the high-profile cases 
involving the limits on Congress’s enumerated powers, such as Lopez, Printz, or
Seminole Tribe.
Consider the most pervasive of these limitations on state power, the doctrine of 
preemption.  So long as Congress acts within its enumerated powers, it can displace state 
law addressing the same subject, and it can do so in express or implied terms.  The fields 
regulated by the federal government have grown dramatically over the last century, such 
that federal law now reaches into almost every corner of national life.  From crime to 
occupational safety to environmental protection, federal law governs private conduct that 
generally was subject only to state control for the Nation’s first 150 years.  Granted, some 
of the Rehnquist Court’s decisions have narrowed the breadth of Congress’s legislative 
powers.  But they have done so only at the margins; Congress can still regulate any 
activity that is economic or commercial in nature, as well as a good deal of activity that is 
not.62 
62 As the Court clarified in Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2206 (2005), 
noneconomic, noncommercial, purely intrastate activities are still subject to federal 
regulation if Congress rationally “concludes that failing to regulate that class of activity 
would undercut” a larger, comprehensive scheme that, taken as a whole, plainly regulates 
interstate commerce.  Id. at 2206.  Moreover, Congress can cure any constitutionally 
deficient statute by adding a “jurisdictional element”—language that ensures, on a case-
by-case basis, that the regulated activity has a sufficient connection to interstate 
commerce.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).  In fact, this is precisely what happened in the wake of 
the Court’s decision in Lopez. A year later, Congress amended the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act to add eleven words to 18 U.S.C. §922(q)(2)(A), defining the relevant offense 
as the knowing possession of “a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects 
interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable 
cause to believe, is a school zone.”  Pub. L. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009, §657 (Sept. 30, 
1996), codified at 18 U.S.C. §922(q)(2)(A) (emphasis added).     
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Thus, in a post-New Deal, post-Great Society world, the vast majority of human 
activity in the United States can be regulated by both the federal government and the 
states.  Consequently, the frequency with which the Supreme Court concludes that federal 
statutes have displaced state law within this expansive realm of concurrent jurisdiction is 
critical to the breadth and significance of the states’ residuary powers.  To cite only a few 
recent examples, it determines the states’ leeway to regulate the practices of health 
maintenance organizations;63 whether states can regulate automobile emissions in an 
effort to reduce greenhouse gases;64 whether states can use their investment and 
procurement practices to express their moral objections to the human rights records of 
foreign regimes;65 and the terms on which states can regulate the advertising and labeling 
of tobacco products to promote the health of their citizens.66 These questions might be 
considered narrow in a constitutional sense, but they are collectively quite important to 
the states’ practical strength as centers of policymaking authority.   
The contours of preemption doctrine, as well the other doctrines surrounding the 
Constitution’s union-preserving federalism provisions, are therefore critical to the values 
that federalism is supposed to promote—the values that Justice O’Connor often 
highlighted.  States can hardly operate as laboratories of democracy, or offer a diverse 
 
63 See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004); Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, 
Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 
(2002).  See also Theodore W. Ruger, The United States Supreme Court and Health Law: 
The Year in Review, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 528 (2004). 
64 See Miguel Bustillo, Stakes High as State Targets Greenhouse Gas from Cars, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at A1 (describing a California law that imposes such regulations, 
and the car industry’s plan to enjoin enforcement on the ground that that the law is 
preempted by federal fuel economy standards). 
65 See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Board of Trustees 
v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989). 
66 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 
505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
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array of public goods, if their idiosyncratic policy initiatives are routinely displaced by 
federal law. As Ernest Young has explained, “[t]he whole point of preemption is 
generally to force national uniformity on a particular issue, stifling state-by-state diversity 
and experimentation.”67 Preemption also pulls the relevant decisionmaking process 
further away from the affected citizens, eliminating the solutions reached by state and 
local communities and placing control of the issue in Washington.68 Moreover, to the 
extent vibrant state autonomy operates as an important check on tyranny, preemption 
undermines this objective by centralizing more control over public policy in one 
government.69 
In short, if we want a complete picture of a justice’s approach to constitutional 
federalism, we need to look beyond the decisions addressing the limits of Congress’s 
powers.  We must also consider those cases involving the various union-preserving 
provisions and doctrines that constrain state authority in areas where federal and state 
regulatory powers overlap.70 As Justice Breyer has suggested, these cases arguably 
present the “true test” of a justice’s commitment to state policymaking autonomy within 
the modern framework of federalism.71 
67 Young, supra note 13, at 130. 
68 S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. 
REV. 687, 694 (1991). 
69 Young, supra note 13, at 132.  
70 Young, supra note 13, at 131 (“[d]octrines limiting federal preemption of state law . . . 
go straight to the heart of the reasons why we care about federalism in the first place”). 
71 Justice Breyer’s full statement reads as follows: “[I]n today’s world, filled with legal 
complexity, the true test of federalist principle may lie, not in the occasional 
constitutional effort to trim Congress’ commerce power at the edges, or to protect a 
State’s treasury from a private damages action, but rather in those many statutory cases 
where courts interpret the mass of technical detail that is the ordinary diet of the law.”  
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160–161 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
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III.  JUSTICE O’CONNOR’S VOTING RECORD IN FEDERALISM CASES 
I am hardly the first person to notice the apparent tension in Justice O’Connor’s 
approach to the two sides of federalism—that she seemed to care more about state 
autonomy in cases involving the limits on Congress than she did in cases involving the 
limits on state governments.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Frank Cross, Richard Fallon, Michael 
Greve, Jonathon Klick, Seth Kreimer, Calvin Massey, Daniel Meltzer, Robert Schapiro, 
and Ernest Young—to name only a few—have made the same point about the five 
justices at the heart of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revival.72 To date, however, no 
scholar has supported this assertion with a comprehensive summary of the justices’ 
voting records.  This study does so, at least with respect to Justice O’Connor.  It 
compares her votes to those of the other justices in every federalism case in which 
O’Connor participated during her tenure on the Court. 
 
A. Study design 
 
The purpose of the study is to test the descriptive accuracy of the common 
assumption that O’Connor tended to favor the states in cases involving constitutional 
federalism.  My hypothesis was that, although this claim seemed generally correct as to 
cases involving the federalism-based limits on the national government, it did not 
 
72 Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering the States When It Matters, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
1313, 1313–14 (2004); Cross, supra note 1, at 1310; Fallon, supra note 13, at 432; 
Michael Greve & Jonathon Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court, 14 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 43 (2006); Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 68 (2001); Massey, supra note 13, at 436; Meltzer, supra note 13, at 
343–44; Schapiro, supra note 13, at ___; Young, supra note 13, at 23.   
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accurately characterize O’Connor’s behavior in cases implicating the structural limits on 
the states.  Because my hypothesis was purely descriptive, testing it only required a 
statistical summary (rather than a regression or some other tool designed to derive 
descriptive inferences).73 
The first step in compiling the data was to define the relevant universe of 
Supreme Court decisions.  I included every case in which Justice O’Connor participated 
where the holding involved a constitutional provision or constitutionally based doctrine 
directly addressing the division of authority between the national government and the 
states.74 And because my hypothesis was that O’Connor’s support for state autonomy 
 
73 On the potential value of statistical summaries to empirical legal studies—and the 
methodological rules governing their validity—see Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules 
of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 24–29 (2002). 
74 The cases included in the study were identified in the following manner:  
• First, I conducted searches in Westlaw’s Supreme Court database (SCT) 
searching for references to one of the relevant constitutional provisions or 
doctrines in the headnotes of opinions.  Thus, I ran queries such as “he(“eleventh 
amendment”),” “he(preempt!),” and “he (“commerce clause”)” for each of the 
relevant provisions or doctrines. 
• Second, I read the text of each opinion generated by these queries to determine 
whether the Court’s holding—its ultimate legal judgment in the case—addressed 
the provision or doctrine queried.  In many cases it did not, as the opinion simply 
referred to the relevant doctrine for other reasons, such as to draw an analogy.  
Such cases were excluded from the universe.   
• Third, my research assistant conducted searches in the Lexis-Nexis Supreme 
Court database (U.S. Supreme Court Cases, Lawyers’ Edition) searching for 
references to one of the relevant constitutional provisions or doctrines in the full 
text of opinions.  For instance, he ran the queries “(eleventh OR 11th) w/3 
amendment” and “(tenth OR 10th) w/3 amendment.”   
• Fourth, my research assistant then read these opinions and excluded those whose 
holdings were clearly unrelated to the queried constitutional provisions or 
doctrines, erring on the side of inclusion.   
• Fifth, after my research assistant compiled lists of decisions involving the various 
provisions and doctrines, I compared these lists to those that I had generated using 
Westlaw.  I read all of the cases on my research assistant’s lists that did not 
appear on my lists.   
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varied depending on whether the constitutional provision at issue limited the national 
government or the states, I separated the cases into these two basic categories.  Thus, with 
respect to the limits on the national government, the study included decisions where the 
holding involved the Commerce Clause, the Spending Clause, the Tenth Amendment (or 
the structural principles it confirms), the Eleventh Amendment (and the sovereign 
immunity it implies), and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  With respect to the 
limits on state governments, the study included decisions where the holding involved the 
doctrine of preemption, the dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of Article IV, the intergovernmental immunity doctrine, the Import-Export 
Clause, and the Qualifications Clauses of Article I (to the extent they limit the states’ 
ability to regulate congressional elections).75 
Admittedly, this universe excludes a number of decisions in which the justices’ 
views on federalism and state autonomy were relevant to the outcomes.76 But expanding 
the scope of the study beyond these parameters would present a number of 
 
• Finally, I added to the study universe those cases discovered by my research 
assistant (which I had not found in Westlaw) where the Court’s holding directly 
addressed the queried provision or doctrine.  
75 Every case included in the study universe is listed in the article’s appendix, infra,
separated by the constitutional provision or doctrine at issue and presented in reverse 
chronological order. 
76 For example, as discussed above, the Court on several occasions has invoked 
federalism principles in cases of statutory interpretation outside the context of 
preemption.  In Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 
(2001), for instance, the Court rejected the Corps’s interpretation of the Clean Water 
Act—which extended the Act’s coverage to nonnavigable, intrastate waters—on the 
ground that it raised “significant constitutional and federalism questions” as to the 
breadth of Congress’s commerce power.  Id. at 174.  It is no coincidence that the five 
justices adopting this construction of the statute were Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Thomas, and that the four dissenters were Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer.  The justices’ underlying views about the breadth of Congress’s commerce power 
plainly shaped their readings of the statute. 
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methodological complications.  To state the obvious, virtually every case that the Court 
decides has some ramifications for the breadth of the states’ policymaking autonomy.77 
Including every case decided by the Court, however, would lump together cases in which 
federalism was the predominant issue with those in which it was only marginally 
relevant.78 A potential solution would be to include those cases in which the federalism 
issues seemed sufficiently salient, but it would be difficult (perhaps impossible) to devise 
selection criteria that would be both objective and meaningful.  And absent such 
objective criteria for defining the universe, the study would violate the important standard 
of replication.79 
Next, I devised a structure for the data summary that would illuminate whether 
Justice O’Connor tended to favor state autonomy.  Merely tabulating the percentage of 
her votes that enhanced state autonomy would tell us precious little.  For instance, as the 
summary below shows, O’Connor voted for the outcome enhancing state autonomy in 48 
percent of the cases involving the federalism-based limits on the states.  By itself, though, 
this does not demonstrate whether O’Connor tended to support state autonomy, tended to 
 
77 In the area of criminal procedure, for instance, the dramatic expansion of the rights 
afforded to criminal defendants as a matter of federal constitutional law over the last fifty 
years has—for better or worse—substantially curtailed the states’ freedom to experiment 
and resolve these questions as they see fit.  See generally William Stutz, Police Powers,
NEW REPUBLIC, July 25, 2005, at 20. 
78 For instance, federalism seems quite important in some of the Court’s habeas corpus 
decisions, but it is essentially inapposite in others.  Compare Coleman v. Thompson, 501 
U.S. 722 (1991), where Justice O’Connor famously began her opinion with the sentence 
“This is a case about federalism,” id. at 727,  with Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 
(2000), which involved a careful parsing of the various ways in which the Anti-Terrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act amended the standards for habeas relief articulated in 28 
U.S.C. §2254. 
79 On the importance of empirical work adhering to the replication standard—ensuring 
that “another researcher should be able to understand, evaluate, build on, and reproduce 
the research without any additional information from the author”—see Epstein & King, 
supra note 73, at 38–45. 
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oppose it, or was ambivalent about it.  Needless to say, a host of other variables or 
influences could have affected her votes in the remaining 52 percent of the cases, all of 
which might be fully consistent with various attitudes about state autonomy.  More to the 
point, the raw figure of 48 percent would mean something quite different depending on 
the context of her colleagues’ behavior.  If the other justices who sat in the same cases 
cast only 20 percent of their votes in favor of state autonomy, O’Connor would look like 
a strong ally of the states; but if 70 percent of her colleagues’ votes in those cases favored 
the states, O’Connor would instead appear quite hostile to state autonomy. 
The summary therefore captures Justice O’Connor’s relative commitment to state 
autonomy.  It compares her votes to those of the other eight justices who sat in precisely 
the same universe of federalism cases.  As a result, all of the potentially relevant 
variables—the various legal texts and precedent, the preferences of other institutional 
actors, the policy consequences of the different outcomes, the quality of the parties’ 
advocacy, etc.—are effectively held constant.  Given identical stimuli, how often did 
Justice O’Connor, compared to her colleagues, vote for outcomes that enhanced state 
autonomy?  My central premise is that, if O’Connor deserves her reputation, she should 
have voted for the states in federalism decisions at a higher rate than the average of the 
other justices who sat in the same cases. 
The summary covers two distinct, overlapping time frames.  The first is Justice 
O’Connor’s entire 24-plus terms on the Court, from October 1981 to January 2006.  Over 
this period, comparisons of O’Connor’s record to those of other individual justices are 
fairly complicated, as they are only valid to the extent of concurrent service.  Moreover, 
each would be only partially revealing of O’Connor’s position relative to the rest of the 
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Court.  Instead, the summary compares her votes to the cumulative record of the other 
justices sitting in the same cases, comparing her record to the average of the other justices 
with whom she served.  The second time period is October 1994 to July 2005.  I include 
this as a distinct frame of reference because the same nine justices served together for 
these eleven terms.  The fortuity of this long-serving “natural court” allows us to compare 
O’Connor’s federalism record to that of other specific justices in a large universe of 
decisions. 
 For every case in the universe, I coded the vote of each justice as either enhancing 
state autonomy (1) or reducing it (0).  In most instances, this was simple.80 Nevertheless, 
three issues are worth mentioning.  First, nine cases presented two separate federalism 
issues that addressed distinct constitutional provisions or doctrines.  For example, in 
United States v. Morrison, the Court addressed two questions: (1) whether the civil 
remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act was within Congress’s commerce 
power, and (2) whether it was valid legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  In cases like this, I treated the justices’ positions on the two issues as two 
separate votes (and coded each as 1 or 0).81 Because the different issues were essentially 
 
80 For example, I coded the five votes to invalidate the Gun-Free School Zones Act in 
Lopez as enhancing state autonomy, as this result left the regulation of the relevant 
activity exclusively to the states.  Likewise, I coded the five votes to hold that 
Massachusetts’s regulations governing cigarette advertising were preempted by the 
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly as 
reducing state autonomy, as this result curtailed the states’ capacity to regulate tobacco 
products. 
81 Thus, the number of votes by O’Connor included in the study is 246, which she 
participated in 237 cases. 
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independent, treating them as separate votes seemed the best reflection of the justices’ 
behavior.82 
Second, some cases presented multiple claims raised under the same 
constitutional provision or doctrine.  In several preemption cases, for example, the Court 
addressed whether a variety of state law actions were preempted by federal law.  In these 
cases, I treated a justice’s split vote—typically, a vote that one claim was preempted 
while another one was not—as half of a vote for each outcome (and thus coded it as 0.5).  
This follows the protocol of another recent empirical study of the Rehnquist Court’s 
voting patterns in preemption cases.83 This is essentially an arbitrary judgment, but 
treating each claim within a preemption case as a separate case risked distorting the 
results through an overpopulation of preemption votes.84 
Finally, some cases defied simple classification as to the constitutional provision 
at issue.  For instance, in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, the Court held that Congress had 
not validly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity from private suits for damages 
because Title I of the ADA was not valid Section 5 legislation.  One might deem this 
either an Eleventh Amendment decision or a Section 5 decision, but including it in both 
would double-count a single vote.  Thus, I simply assigned these cases to one category or 
the other.  (I classified Garrett and similar decisions, for example, as Eleventh 
Amendment cases.)  Such judgments about categorization are only matters of form, as the 
 
82 Because only nine cases presented two distinct issues, this choice of treatment has only 
a minor impact on the study’s overall results. 
83 See Greve & Klick, supra note 72, at ___. 
84 Again, the number of such cases is rather small, so the choice of treatment has only a 
minor impact on the overall results. 
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study ultimately combines Eleventh Amendment and Section 5 cases under the broader 
heading of federalism decisions involving the limits on the national government.    
It is worth noting that, because the study aims to describe the justices’ behavior 
by tallying their votes favoring one outcome or another, it suffers from the same 
shortcomings as other studies employing similar vote-counting, outcome-focused 
methodologies.85 First, it ignores what the justices have actually written in their opinions.  
And at the Supreme Court of the United States, the content of the opinions can be just as 
important—indeed, much more important—than whether the judgment under review is 
affirmed, reversed, or vacated.86 For example, in the 2004 case of Tennessee v. Lane,87 
the Court held that Congress had validly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity in 
enacting Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, at least with respect to its 
application to state judicial facilities.  The vote was 5–4, and Justice O’Connor joined the 
majority.  I therefore coded her vote as reducing state autonomy.   
But focusing exclusively on the outcome her vote supported misses much of what 
happened in Lane. The majority substantially limited the scope of its holding 
(presumably to hold O’Connor’s vote) by only addressing Title II’s application to state 
courthouses.  The Court did not address the much broader question, pressed by the 
parties, as to whether Title II validly abrogates state immunity when applied to the 
thousands of other public accommodations covered by the ADA.  Thus, while O’Connor 
 
85 On the weaknesses inherent in such studies, see Frank B. Cross, Thomas A. Smith & 
Antonio Tomarchio, The Reagan Revolution in the Network of Law, at 7–8 (2006) 
(working paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=909217); 
Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 261, 265–266 
(2006). 
86 See Friedman, supra note 85, at 265–266 (discussing the importance of the content of 
Supreme Court’s opinions in evaluating the significance of the Court’s work). 
87 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
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sided with Congress, she did so on limited terms, a nuance that binary vote counting 
necessarily misses.   
By presenting O’Connor’s voting record in federalism cases relative to the 
justices with whom she served, I have substantially mitigated this problem.  Regardless 
of how the majority framed the question in a given case, the justices voted in ways that 
expressed their relative preferences.  For instance, one might question whether 
O’Connor’s vote in Lane was unfavorable to state autonomy in an absolute sense, but it 
clearly was less protective of state autonomy than to those registered by Rehnquist, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.  Still, had Justice Stevens (the majority opinion writer) 
framed the issue more broadly, O’Connor might well have switched sides.  That is, 
Stevens’s discretionary choices about the content of his opinion may well have altered 
O’Connor’s vote.  Thus, focusing on the justices’ relative voting records does not solve 
the problem entirely; some votes to affirm or reverse (as opposed to just decisions to 
concur separately) probably depend on the content of the Court’s opinions. 
Another weakness of outcome-based vote counting is that it places equal weight 
on each decision, even though some cases are clearly more significant than others.  The 
Court’s decision in Lopez to hold for the first time in sixty years that Congress had 
exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause seems a more important data point in 
measuring the justices’ respective views on federalism than its decision in California v. 
Deep Sea Research, Inc.88 that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal jurisdiction 
over in rem admiralty actions when the state does not possess the property at issue.  
Again, one could try to weight the cases according to some assessment of their relative 
 
88 523 U.S. 491 (1998). 
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significance, but doing so would raise the same issue of replication discussed earlier.  By 
not doing so, though, we obviously sacrifice a finer grained appreciation of the 
importance of the justices’ various votes. 
But these weaknesses should not be overstated.  Outcomes may be a rather crude 
measure of the Court’s decisional output,89 but they can still tell us a great deal about 
patterns of judicial behavior.  After all, the outcome a justice supports in a given case is 
often—perhaps even typically—the most revealing single piece of information about her 
views on the issue.  Moreover, focusing on outcomes allows us to record the justices’ 
positions quite objectively, reducing the potential for various biases in our data 
collection.  Of course, outcome-based studies cannot answer all the interesting questions 
we have about judicial decisionmaking.90 But they nonetheless can constitute a 




1. October 1981 to January 2006 
 
89 See Cross, Smith & Tomarchio, supra note 85, at 7 (describing outcome-based studies 
as “a very crude measure of Supreme Court output”). 
90 See Friedman, supra note 85, at 265–266. 
91 See Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the 
“Legal Model” of Judicial Decisionmaking, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 494–495 (2001) 
(describing the importance of such studies, even if they should be supplemented with 
historical and interpretivist inquiries). 
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From October 1981, when O’Connor was sworn in Associate Justice, until 
January 2006, when she was replaced by Samuel Alito, O’Connor participated in 239 
federalism decisions, casting 248 votes (as counted under the terms discussed earlier).  
Fifty-seven of these votes addressed the structural limits on the national government’s 
power.  O’Connor cast 67 percent of her votes in these cases to invalidate the action of 
the national government, and thus in favor of enhancing state autonomy.  As Table 1 




Votes in Favor of State Autonomy in Federalism Cases Addressing the Limits on  
the National Government—All Decisions, October 1981 to January 2006 
 
O'Connor Other justices 
 
Eleventh Amendment 64% 38% 
 (n=39) (n=308) 
 
Tenth Amendment 67% 24% 
 (n=9) (n=72) 
 
Commerce Clause 60% 25% 
 (n=5) (n=40) 
 
Section 5 100% 71% 
 (n=2) (n=14) 
 
Spending Clause 50% 6% 
 (n=2) (n=16) 
 
TOTAL 67% 35% 
 (n=57) (n=450) 
 
O’Connor’s record of favoring state autonomy in these cases is even clearer if we 
confine our review to the Court’s non-unanimous decisions.  In the 39 such cases 
(yielding 40 distinct votes), O’Connor was substantially more likely to vote for the result 
enhancing the states’ autonomy than her colleagues: 88 percent of her votes were to 
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invalidate the federal action at issue, compared to a rate of 45 percent among the other 
justices (n = 318).  This is entirely consistent with her popular reputation as a strong 
supporter of the states’ independent sovereignty and autonomy.   
The picture is quite different in federalism cases involving the structural limits on 
state authority.  Over her full tenure on the Court, O’Connor participated in 185 cases in 
which a state law was challenged on federalism grounds, yielding 192 distinct votes.  
Roughly half of O’Connor’s votes in these cases—52 percent, precisely—were to 
invalidate the state law at issue.  As Table 2 illustrates, this was essentially 




Votes in Favor of State Autonomy in Federalism Cases Addressing the Limits on  





Dormant Commerce Clause 46% 42%
(n=48) (n=366)
Intergovernmental immunity 43% 50%
(n=5) (n=52)
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV 17% 19%
(n=6) (n=48)
Import-Export Clause 100% 100%
(n=3) (n=23)
Qualifications Clauses 100% 38%
(n=1) (n=8)
TOTAL 48% 47%
(n=192) (n=1488)  
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Isolating the non-unanimous decisions reveals the same basic picture: in cases 
involving the federalism-based limits on the states, O’Connor’s voting record over her 
full tenure on the Court was no different than the average remaining justice.  She cast 46 
percent of her 108 votes in these cases to uphold the state law at issue, compared to an 
average of 45 percent among the remaining justices (n = 837). 
 
2. October 1994 to July 2005 
 
The same dichotomous pattern holds for O’Connor’s last eleven full terms on the 
Court, though her record in the union-preserving federalism cases is even more 
intriguing.  From October 1994 to July 2005, the Court decided 25 cases involving the 
limits on Congress’s enumerated powers, yielding 27 distinct votes.  As Table 3 
illustrates, the justices’ voting patterns in these cases conform to the common perception 
of the Rehnquist Court: Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas typically 
voted to invalidate the assertion of federal authority at issue, while Stevens, Souter, 




Votes in Favor of State Autonomy in Federalism Cases Addressing the Limits on the National 
Government—All Decisions, October 1994 to June 2005  
(n = 27) 
Issue Souter Breyer Stevens Ginsburg Kennedy O'Connor Rehnquist Scalia Thomas
Eleventh Amendment (n=17) 6% 6% 6% 12% 71% 65% 71% 82% 82%
Commerce Clause (n=5) 0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 60% 60% 40% 60%
Section 5 (n=2) 0% 0% 50% 50% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Tenth Amendment (n=2) 0% 0% 0% 0% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
Spending Clause (n=1) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total (n=27) 4% 4% 7% 11% 63% 63% 67% 70% 74%  
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The Court’s polarization is even clearer when we limit our review to its non-
unanimous decisions.  In these 17 cases (yielding 18 votes), the Court almost always split 
5–4 along the same lines.  Justice O’Connor’s record in these cases thus substantiates her 
reputation as a strong proponent of state autonomy.  Over these eleven terms, there were 
only three non-unanimous decisions in which O’Connor voted to uphold the exercise of 




Votes in Favor of State Autonomy in Federalism Cases Addressing the Limits on the National 
Government—Non-unanimous Decisions, October 1994 to June 2005 

















































 Again, O’Connor’s record was quite different in cases addressing the federalism-
based limits on the states.  Over the same time period, the Court decided 55 cases 
involving the constitutional provisions constraining state power, yielding 57 distinct 
votes.  More than two-thirds of these votes (42) involved the doctrine of preemption.  In 
these state-limiting cases, Justice O’Connor was hardly sympathetic to the states’ policy 
initiatives—indeed, she was the justice least likely to sustain the assertion of state 




Votes in Favor of State Autonomy in Federalism Cases Addressing the Limits on  
State Governments—All Decisions, October 1994 to June 2005 
(n = 57)
Issue Souter Breyer Stevens Ginsburg Kennedy O'Connor Rehnquist Scalia Thomas
Preemption (n=42) 55% 55% 58% 58% 40% 38% 46% 42% 54%
Dormant Commerce Clause (n=11) 36% 27% 36% 45% 36% 36% 55% 45% 64%
Privileges and Immunities Clause (n=2) 0% 0% 0% 50% 50% 0% 50% 0% 0%
Intergovernmental tax immunity (n=1) 100% 0% 100% 100% 100% 0% 100% 100% 100%
Qualifications Clauses (n=1) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total (n=57) 49% 46% 52% 55% 40% 37% 50% 44% 55%  
O’Connor’s indifference to state autonomy in this context is even starker when we 
isolate the Court’s non-unanimous decisions.  In the 27 cases since October 1994 in 
which the Court disagreed over the application of a federalism-based limit on the states, 
O’Connor cast only 7.5 votes (28 percent) to uphold the challenged state law.  As Table 6 
shows, this was a lower rate than any of the justices with whom she usually kept 
company in cases involving the other side of federalism.  In other words, in decisions in 
which the justices disagreed, O’Connor cast nearly three-fourths of her votes in favor of 
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IV.  DISCUSSION 
In her first public address after announcing her retirement, Justice O’Connor said 
that she viewed the states as “laboratories”: we should “let them try things and see how it 
works.”92 The sentiment is one commonly associated with O’Connor, but it is not one 
that she consistently expressed in her voting record as a justice, at least in cases directly 
presenting federalism questions.  To be sure, O’Connor consistently voted for results that 
protected state prerogatives in cases implicating the structural limits on the national 
government.  But in cases involving the Constitution’s union-preserving federalism 
provisions—its structural limits on the states—she did not show a similar inclination to 
“let them try things.”  In these cases, her record was essentially indistinguishable from 
the average justice with whom she served.   
 If O’Connor was not the ardent proponent of state autonomy that many have 
presumed, are there alternative descriptions that capture her behavior in the full universe 
of federalism cases?  Developing a positive theory of O’Connor’s approach to 
federalism—whether quantitative or qualitative—would require the aggregation of 
additional data and the application of more sophisticated methods, both of which go 
beyond the scope of my study here.  But let me at least suggest a line of inquiry—one 
that would be fully consistent with the priorities of the Republican Party of the late 
twentieth century that propelled O’Connor onto the Court.  
 Aside from conceptualizing federalism cases as presenting a choice between more 
or less state autonomy, we might also see them as presenting choices about the extent of 
 
92 Ralph Thomas, Retiring Justice Worries About Loss of States’ Rights, SEATTLE TIMES,
July 22, 2005, at A1. 
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government regulation generally.  Whether they involve the breadth of Congress’s 
enumerated powers or the union-preserving limits on the states, at stake are limits on the 
government’s power to regulate.  Of course, when the Court holds that that a state law 
has been preempted—and often when it concludes that a state law violates the dormant 
Commerce Clause—federal regulation of the same activity remains in place.  But a 
judgment invalidating the state law necessarily reduces the aggregate level and stringency 
of the regulation of that activity.  In other words, every federalism case presents some 
version of a choice between more or less regulation. 
 From this perspective, we can derive an alternative characterization O’Connor’s 
voting record in federalism cases: a general disposition towards reducing government 
regulation, regardless of its source.93 To demonstrate this, we need to adjust the coding 
of the justices’ votes only slightly.  No adjustment is necessary for the cases involving the 
limits on the national government, as a vote in favor of state autonomy in this context 
also favors reducing the government’s regulatory authority.  We simply need to reverse 
the coding of the cases involving the federalism-based limits on the states, as a vote 
favoring state autonomy in this context is one to uphold a greater level of regulation.  
 With these adjustments in mind, consider again Justice O’Connor’s 148 votes in 
non-unanimous federalism cases over her 24-plus terms on the Court: 63 percent of those 
votes favored a reduction in government regulation, while the average among the other 
 
93 Others, such as Frank Cross and Richard Fallon—taking a bluntly political view of the 
Rehnquist Court’s behavior—have noted the deregulatory valence to aspects of the 
Court’s federalism project.  See Cross, supra note 1, at 1322–1324 (describing the 
deregulatory nature of the Rehnquist Court’s 1999 federalism decisions that limited the 
legislative authority of Congress); Fallon, supra note 13, at 470–471 (positing that “the 
substantive conservatism of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy” may well lead “them to 
view the Commerce Clause as embodying antiregulatory, procompetitive ideals”). 
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justices sitting in the same cases was 52 percent.  Thus, her distance from the average 
voting record of the other justices was essentially the same along the two dimensions of 
greater state autonomy and less government regulation.  That is, she was 12 percent more 
likely than her colleagues to vote for outcomes that enhanced state autonomy, and she 
was 11 percent more likely than her colleagues to vote for outcomes that reduced the 




Votes in Non-unanimous Federalism Cases—October 1981 to January 2006 
 
O'Connor Other justices 
 (n=148) (n=1155) 
 
Votes to invalidate regulation 63% 52% 
 
Votes in favor of state autonomy 57% 45% 
 
The deregulatory nature of O’Connor’s voting record in federalism cases was 
especially pronounced in her last eleven full terms on the Court.  She cast 34.5 of her 45 
votes in these cases (77 percent) to invalidate the regulation at issue, whether it emanated 
from the federal government or the states.  Thus, from October 1994 to July 2005, 






Votes in Favor of Reducing Regulation or Regulatory Authority in Federalism Cases Combined 
—Non-unanimous Decisions, October 1994 to June 2005 















































Again,  these statistics alone do not support the inference that O’Connor voted as 
she did because of a preference to reduce government regulation; my claims here are 
purely descriptive.  Still, the findings are interesting, if not altogether surprising.  First, 
O’Connor’s tendency to support state autonomy—though greater than the average 
justice—only manifested itself in cases involving the limits on the federal government; 
she was no more protective of state autonomy than the average justice in cases involving 
the structural limits on the states.  Second, in the full run of federalism cases, O’Connor 
voted as frequently to reduce regulation as she did to enhance state policymaking 
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autonomy, and she did so much more frequently over her last eleven full terms on the 
Court.   
 
CONCLUSION 
In his pathbreaking 1957 article “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme 
Court as a National Policy-Maker,” Robert Dahl wrote that “the policy views dominant 
on the [Supreme] Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant 
among the lawmaking majorities of the United States.”94 More recently, a number of 
political scientists have extended and refined Dahl’s thesis, forming a school of thought 
commonly known as the “regime politics” approach to judicial behavior.  The basic 
theory—advanced by such scholars as Mark Graber, Howard Gillman, Cornell Clayton, 
Mitch Pickerill, Keith Whittington, and Terri Peretti—is that the Court’s power and 
substantive views are deliberately constructed by the dominant national political 
coalition.  Though the Court certainly exercises independent judgment on a case-by-case 
basis, its general ideological direction is shaped by political developments external to the 
Court.  Constitutional evolution is more the product of shifts in the governing national 
coalition than the occasion of the justices finally being won over by particular legal 
arguments.  Thus, the Court is best conceived as an integral policy-making partner of the 
ascendant political majority, or at least an influential segment of that majority.95 
94 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957). 
95 There are two principal mechanisms by which this might occur.  First, the President 
and the Senate select justices based largely on their ideology, ensuring that the justices’ 
substantive views will tend to reflect those of the dominant coalition at the time of their 
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 Regime politics theory might be better suited to explain the behavior of the Court 
as a whole than the actions of a single justice.  But Justice O’Connor’s voting record in 
federalism cases largely resembles the political priorities of the conservative movement 
that gave rise to her career.  While the Republican Party of the last thirty years has often 
emphasized the importance of the independent sovereignty of the states, it has generally 
done so by advocating for enforcement of the structural limits on Congress’s authority 
and for a reduction of the size of the federal government.96 To be sure, GOP thought on 
the subject has not been monolithic, and those genuinely committed to state autonomy 
have achieved some policy successes, such as the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 
1995.97 But the modern Republican Party as a whole has never embraced a broader 
constitutional program to substantially enhance the legislative autonomy of the states.98 
This seems especially true in the area of commercial regulation.  Consider such GOP 
initiatives as the decades-long effort to enact federal tort reform legislation (recently 
resulting in the Class Action Fairness Act99), the inclusion of express preemption clauses 
 
nominations.  Second, regardless of the views that they take to the bench, the Court as an 
institution is substantially constrained by the preferences of the contemporary Congress 
and President.  Without the sword or the purse, the justices must be cognizant—
consciously or unconsciously—of the views of the extant political regime in making their 
decisions. 
96 See Pickerill & Clayton, supra note 13, at 236–239 (discussing the Republican Party’s 
federalism initiatives since the 1970s). 
97 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§1501–1538, 1571 (2000). 
98 For instance, consider such Republican-sponsored initiatives as the Defense of 
Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996); the No Child Left Behind Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107–110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002); the effort to intervene in the Terri 
Schiavo saga, To Provide for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. 
No. 109–3 (2005); and the Department of Justice’s attempts to undercut California’s 
legalization of medical marijuana, see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), and 
Oregon’s legalization of physician-assisted suicide, see Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 
904 (2006). 
99 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–2, 119 Stat. 4. 
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in numerous Republican-sponsored statutes,100 and the use of agency rulemaking by the 
present Bush Administration to preempt wide swaths of state law, just to name a few.101 
Justice O’Connor clearly cared about federalism, and she clearly believed in the 
judicial enforcement of the structural limits on the national government.  But her voting 
record in cases involving the federalism-based constraints on state governments did not 
reveal a particular concern for state policymaking autonomy more generally.  Like the 
political coalition that placed her on the Court—or at least an influential aspect of that 
coalition—she tended to favor outcomes that enhanced state autonomy, but to no greater 
degree than she favored outcomes that reduced the stringency of government regulation.  
In this way, she appears to have reflected the priorities of the modern Republican Party, a 
fact we should probably find unsurprising. 
 
100 See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–148 
(preempting state tort law with respect to injuries from certain drugs and vaccines); 
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109–92 (preempting state 
authority to file civil actions against gun manufacturers); Energy Policy Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109–58 (preempting various state environmental protections); CAN SPAM 
Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108–187 (preempting state laws regulating unsolicited e-mail spam); 
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–159 (preempting 
some state credit reporting and identity theft laws). 
101 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the 
Federalization of Tort Reform, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=900020 (discussing efforts to 
preempt state laws through rulemaking by the Food and Drug Administration, the 
Consumer Products Safety Commission, and the National Highway and Transportation 
Safety Administration).  See also Stephen Labaton, ‘Silent Tort Reform’ Is Overriding 
States’ Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at C5. 
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Appendix 
The following is a list of all the cases that were included in the study, sorted by 
subject matter, and presented in reverse chronological order. 
 
DECISIONS ADDRESSING THE LIMITS ON THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
Commerce Clause 
 
Gonzalez v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) 
Guillen v. Pierce County, 537 U.S. 129 (2005) 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 




Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) 
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) 
Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773 (1983) 
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) 
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) 




Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004) 




Central Virginia Comm. Coll. V. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006) 
United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006) 
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) 
Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004) 
Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004) 
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) 
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FMC v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) 
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. System of Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002)  
Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002) 
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Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993) 
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) 
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McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990) 
Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990) 
Hoffman v. Conn. Dep’t of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989) 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989) 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) 
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989) 
Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways & Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987) 
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986) 
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985) 
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Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) 
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Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844 (1989) 
Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989) 
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